Report a vulnerability
Please report security problems privately, not in a public issue: open the Security tab of the repository and click Report a vulnerability, with the affected version and how to reproduce it. We confirm reports within a few working days, fix confirmed problems in a new release and credit the reporter in the release notes unless they prefer otherwise.
Security fixes are released for the newest version. Machine-readable contact: security.txt.
How WatchZit protects your network
Console
HTTPS only; the console and the agent port answer only the networks you allow. Two-factor sign-in for every local account, Argon2id passwords, blocking of addresses after failed sign-ins, protection against cross-site requests, a strict Content-Security-Policy and a hash-chained audit log.
Agents and collectors
Agents and remote collectors connect outbound only, so monitored computers and branch offices need no open ports. Each agent is known by its own key and trusts the server by the pinned fingerprint of its agent certificate from the one-time enrollment code.
Passwords of your devices
SNMP communities and keys, database, API and SSH passwords and notification channels are encrypted with the server's secret key and never shown again. The MaxZit Launcher opens devices only from signed one-time links of consoles you paired, and never stores passwords.
Your network only
No cloud service, no telemetry, no account with us. Root actions of the console (updates, network, SSH, time zone) go through a separate helper; the diagnostics ZIP removes passwords, communities, tokens and keys.
How releases are protected
- Every release is signed with the WatchZit Ed25519 release key; the console verifies the signature and checksums before installing an update, also one uploaded as files.
- The install script verifies the signature and checksum of the release it downloads.
- Packages are built from tagged commits; images carry a written source offer (
SOURCE-CODE.txt). - A console update backs up the database first and rolls back automatically if the new version does not start.
How WatchZit is tested
On every change (GitHub Actions)
| Check | What it finds |
|---|---|
| CI | gofmt, go vet and the full test suite against an embedded PostgreSQL; Linux, ARM64 and Windows builds, Windows agent tests and the MSI |
| Race detector | The whole test suite again with -race: data races between pollers, agent connections, alerts and web requests |
| Fuzzing | 13 parsers of untrusted input — SNMP answers and traps, syslog, NetFlow/IPFIX/sFlow, stored measurements, JSON data sources, watchzit:// links, enrollment codes, SSO state and SAML metadata, network allow-lists, web scenario steps: crashes and checks that can be bypassed |
| gosec (Linux, Windows) | Insecure Go patterns: command execution, file permissions, weak cryptography; every accepted finding carries a written reason in the code |
| CodeQL | Injection, path traversal, unsafe redirects and other data-flow bugs (Go, JavaScript, workflows) |
| govulncheck | Known vulnerabilities in Go and in the dependencies the code actually calls |
| staticcheck (Linux, Windows) | Bugs and dead code |
| Dependabot | Vulnerable or outdated Go modules and actions |
| Secret scanning | Credentials committed by mistake (with push protection) |
| OpenSSF Scorecard | Supply-chain practices of the repository |
The main branch is protected: it takes only commits that pass the required checks, and nobody can force-push to it.
Before every release (in a test lab, on the exact release candidate)
| Check | What it finds |
|---|---|
| Semgrep | Injection, XSS, insecure cookies, open redirects (Go, JavaScript, secrets, OWASP Top 10 rules) |
| Trivy | Vulnerable dependencies, secrets and misconfigurations |
| Gitleaks | Secrets in the whole git history |
| OWASP ZAP | Full scan signed in as an administrator: XSS, SQL injection, CSRF, path traversal, header problems |
| Role probes | A crawl of every page as administrator, operator and viewer: write and admin routes refuse roles that may not use them |
| Appliance image | Trivy over its operating-system packages, a Lynis hardening audit, testssl.sh on the console (8443) and agent (8444) ports, and Nuclei: outdated packages, weak settings, TLS problems, known exposures |
| End-to-end QA | Real devices and agents: MikroTik, SNMP agents, Windows and Linux agents and remote collectors |
Findings are fixed before the release; accepted risks are documented in the release notes.
This website
watchzit.com is a static site: only a language cookie, no analytics, no trackers, no third-party scripts or fonts, and a Content-Security-Policy that allows no scripts at all. See the privacy policy.